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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical study of how immigration influences the joint
determination of the wage structure and internal migration behavior for native-born workers in local
labor markets. Using data from the 1960-2000 decennial censuses, the study shows that immigration
is associated with lower in-migration rates, higher out-migration rates, and a decline in the growth
rate of the native workforce. The native migration response attenuates the measured impact of
immigration on wages in a local labor market by 40 to 60 percent, depending on whether the labor
market is defined at the state or metropolitan area level.
George J. Borjas






NATIVE INTERNAL MIGRATION AND THE LABOR MARKET  
IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION 
 




  Immigrants in the United States cluster in a small number of geographic areas. In 2000, 
for example, 69.2 percent of working-age immigrants resided in six states (California, New 
York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey), but only 33.7 percent of natives lived in those 
states. Similarly, 38.4 percent of immigrants lived in four metropolitan areas (New York, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco), but only 12.2 percent of natives lived in the four 
metropolitan areas with the largest native-born populations (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
and Philadelphia). 
  Economic theory suggests that immigration into a closed labor market affects the wage 
structure in that market by lowering the wage of competing workers and raising the wage of 
complements. Most of the empirical studies in the literature exploit the geographic clustering of 
immigrants to measure the labor market impact of immigration by defining the labor market 
along a geographic dimension—such as a state or a metropolitan area. Beginning with Grossman 
(1982), the typical study relates a measure of native economic outcomes in the locality (or the 
change in that outcome) to the relative quantity of immigrants in that locality (or the change in 
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the relative number).1 The regression coefficient, or “spatial correlation,” is then interpreted as 
the impact of immigration on the native wage structure. 
There are two well-known problems with this approach. First, immigrants may not be 
randomly distributed across labor markets. If immigrants tend to cluster in areas with thriving 
economies, there would be a spurious positive correlation between immigration and wages either 
in the cross-section or in the time-series. This spurious correlation could attenuate or reverse 
whatever measurable negative effects immigrants might have had on the wage of competing 
native workers.2 
Second, natives may respond to the entry of immigrants into a local labor market by 
moving their labor or capital to other localities until native wages and returns to capital are again 
equalized across areas. An inter-region comparison of the wage of native workers might show 
little or no difference because the effects of immigration are diffused throughout the national 
economy, and not because immigration had no economic effects. 
In view of these potential problems, it is not too surprising that the empirical literature 
has produced a confusing array of results. The measured impact of immigration on the wage of 
native workers in local labor markets fluctuates widely from study to study, but seems to cluster 
around zero. In recent work (Borjas, 2003), I show that by defining the labor market at the 
national level—which more closely approximates the theoretical counterpart of a closed labor 
market—the measured wage impact of immigration becomes much larger. By examining the 
evolution of wages in the 1960-2000 period within narrow skill groups (defined in terms of 
                                                 
1 See also Altonji and Card (1991); Borjas (1987); Card (1990, 2001); LaLonde and Topel (1991); and 
Schoeni (1997). Friedberg and Hunt (1995) survey the literature. 
2 Borjas (2001) argues that income-maximizing immigrants would want to cluster in high-wage regions, 
helping to move the labor market towards a long-run equilibrium. The evidence indeed suggests that, within 
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schooling and labor market experience), I concluded that a 10-percent immigrant-induced 
increase in the number of workers in a particular skill group reduces the wage of that group by 3 
to 4 percent. 
In this paper, I explore the disparate findings implied by the two approaches by focusing 
on a particular adjustment mechanism that native workers may use to avoid the adverse impacts 
of immigration on local labor markets: internal migration. A number of studies already examine 
if native migration decisions respond to immigration. As with the wage-impact literature, these 
studies offer a cornucopia of strikingly different findings, with some studies finding strong 
effects (Filer 1992; and Frey 1995), and other studies reporting little connection (Card 2001; and 
Kritz and Gurak2001).3 
This paper can be viewed as an attempt to reconcile two related, but so far unconnected, 
strands in the immigration literature. I present a theoretical framework that jointly models wage 
determination in local labor markets and the native migration decision. The theory yields 
estimable equations that explicitly link the parameters measuring the wage impact of 
immigration at the national level, the spatial correlation between wages and immigration in local 
labor markets, and the native migration response. The model clearly shows that the larger the 
native migration response, the greater will be the difference between the estimates of the national 
wage effect and the spatial correlation. The model also implies that it is possible to use the 
spatial correlations to calculate the “true” national impact of immigration as long as one has 
information on the migration response of native workers.  
I use data drawn from all the Census cross-sections between 1960 and 2000 to estimate 
the key parameters of the model. The data indicate that the measured wage impact of   4
immigration depends intimately on the geographic definition of the labor market, and is larger as 
one expands the size of the market—from the metropolitan area, to the state, to the Census 
division, and ultimately to the nation. In contrast, although the measured impact of immigration 
on native migration rates also depends on the geographic definition of the labor market, these 
effects become smaller as one expands the size of the market. These mirror-image patterns 
suggest that the wage effects of immigration on local labor markets are more attenuated the 
easier that natives find it to “vote with their feet.” In fact, the native migration response can 
account for between 40 to 60 percent of the difference in the measured wage impact of 
immigration between the national and local labor market levels, depending on whether the local 
labor market is defined by a state or by a metropolitan area. 
 
II. Theory 
I use a simple model of the joint determination of the regional wage structure and the 
internal migration decision of native workers to show the types of parameters that spatial 
correlations identify, and to determine if these parameters can be used to measure the national 
labor market impact of immigration.4 Suppose that the labor demand function for workers in skill 
group i residing in geographic area j at time t can be written as: 
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4 The model is an application of the Blanchard and Katz (1992) framework that analyzes how local labor 
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(1997, unpublished appendix), and further elaborated in Borjas (1999). The current presentation differs from the 
earlier iterations in several ways, particularly by incorporating the presence of internal migration flows before the 
immigrant influx begins and by deriving estimable equations that can be used to identify the key theoretical 
parameters.   5




where wijt is the wage of workers in cell (i, j, t); Xijt is a demand shifter; Lijt gives the total 
number of workers (both immigrants, Mijt, and natives, Nijt); and η is the factor price elasticity 
(with η < 0). It is convenient to interpret the elasticity η as the “true” impact that an immigrant 
influx would have in a closed labor market in the short run, a labor market where neither capital 
nor native-born labor responds to the increased supply.  
Suppose the demand shifter is both time-invariant and region-invariant (Xijt = Xi). This 
simplification implies that wages for skill group i differ across regions only because the stock of 
workers is not evenly distributed geographically.5 I assume that the total number of native 
workers in a particular skill group in the national economy is fixed at  . i N  It would not be 
difficult to extend the model to allow for differential rates of growth (across region-skill groups) 
in the size of the native workforce. 
 Suppose  that  Nij,-1 native workers in skill group i reside in region j in the pre-immigration 
period (t = −1). This geographic sorting of native workers does not represent a long-run 
equilibrium; some regions have too many workers and other regions too few. The regional wage 
differentials induce a migration response by native workers even prior to the immigrant influx. In 
particular, region j experiences a net migration of ∆Nij0 natives belonging to skill group i 
between t = −1 and t = 0. 
                                                 
5 The extension of the model to incorporate differences in the level of the demand curve would be very 
cumbersome unless the determinants of the regional differences in demand are well specified. The assumption that 
the demand shifter is time-invariant implies that the immigrant influx will necessarily lower the average wage in the 
economy. This adverse wage effect could be dampened by allowing for endogenous capital growth (or for capital 
flows from abroad).   6
Beginning at time 0, the local labor market (as defined by a particular skill-region cell) 
receives an influx of Mijt immigrants. The immigrant influx continues in all subsequent periods. 
A convenient (but restrictive) assumption is that region j receives the same number of 
immigrants in each year. The annual immigrant influx for a particular skill-region cell can then 
be represented by Mij.6 
For simplicity, I assume that immigrants do not migrate internally within the United 
States—they enter region j and remain there.7 Natives continue to make relocation decisions, and 
region j experiences a net migration of ∆Nij1 natives in period 1, ∆Nij2 natives in period 2, and so 
on. The labor demand function in (1) implies that the wage for skill group i in region j at time t is 
given by:8 
 
(2)   log  wijt = log Xi + η log [Nij,-1 + (t + 1)Mij + ∆Nij0 + ∆Nij1 + . . . + ∆Nijt], 
 
which can be rewritten as: 
                                                 
6 The model can incorporate a time-varying immigrant influx to each region as long as the growth rate of 
the immigrant stock in group (i, j) is constant. It is worth noting, however, that the location decisions of new 
immigrants may shift over time. In the 1990s, for example, the traditional immigrant gateways of New York and Los 
Angeles attracted relatively fewer immigrants as the new immigrants began to settle in areas that did not have 
sizable foreign-born populations; see Funkhouser (2000) and Zavodny (1999).  
7 The initial evidence reported in Bartel (1989) and Bartel and Koch (1991) suggested that immigrants had 
lower rates of internal migration than natives and that the internal migration decisions of immigrants were not as 
sensitive to regional wage differences, but instead were heavily influenced by the location decisions of earlier 
immigrant waves. However, more recent evidence reported in Gurak and Kritz (2000) indicates that the interstate 
migration rate of immigrants is almost as high as that of natives and that immigrant migration decisions are 
becoming more sensitive to economic conditions in the state of origin; see also Belanger and Rogers (1992) and 
Kritz and Nogle (1994). 
8 Note that the model assumes the market clears and ignores the participation decision of native workers. 
However, part of the adjustment mechanism to the immigrant-induced supply shifts may occur through a decline in 
labor force participation or an increase in unemployment in the native population. The corresponding decline in the 
number of working natives would attenuate the wage response and reduce the need for native internal migration; see 
Rowthorn and Glyn (2003) for a related discussion.   7
 
(3)   log  wijt ≈ log wij,-1 + η [(t + 1) mij + vij0 + vij1+ … + vijt ],     for t ≥ 0, 
 
where mij = Mij / Nij,-1, the flow of immigrants in a particular skill group entering region j relative 
to the initial native stock; and vijt = ∆Nijt / Nij,-1, the net migration rate of natives. Note that wij,-1 
gives the wage offered to workers in group (i, j) in the pre-immigration period. 
I assume that the internal migration response of native workers occurs with a lag. For 
example, immigrants begin to arrive at t = 0. The demand function in equation (3) implies that 
the wage response to immigration is immediate, so that wages fall in the immigrant-penetrated 
regions. The immigrant-induced migration decisions of natives, however, are not observed until 
the next period. The lagged supply response that describes the native migration decisions is 
given by: 
 
(4)   vijt = σ (log wij,t-1 – log w −
i,t-1), 
 
where σ is the supply elasticity, and log w −
i,t-1 is the equilibrium wage (for skill group i) that will 
be observed throughout the national economy once all migration responses to the immigrant 
influx that has occurred up to time t − 1 have been made.9 Income-maximizing behavior on the 
part of native workers implies that the elasticity σ is positive. If σ is sufficiently “small,” the 
                                                 
9 More precisely, log w −
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relative to the total number of natives in that skill group. The model implicitly assumes that the native population is 
large enough (relative to the immigrant stock) to be able to equalize the number of workers across labor markets 
through internal migration.   8
migration response of natives may not be completed within one period.10 Note that the migration 
decision is made by forward-looking native workers who compare the current wage in region j to 
the wage that region j will eventually attain. Therefore, natives have perfect information about 
the eventual outcome that results from immigration. Workers are not making decisions based on 
erroneous information (as in the typical cobweb model). Instead, the lags arise because it is 
difficult to change locations immediately.11  
As noted above, the existence of regional wage differentials at time t = −1 implies that 
native internal migration was taking place even prior to the beginning of immigration. It is useful 
to describe the determinants of the net migration flow vij0. In the pre-immigration period, the 
equilibrium wage that would be eventually attained in the economy is: 
 
(5)   log  w −
i,-1 = Xi + η log
*




i N  represent the number of native workers in skill group i that would live in each region 
once long-run equilibrium is attained.12 The pre-existing net migration rate of native workers is 
then given by: 
 
                                                 
10 The migration behavior underlying equation (4) is analogous to the firm’s behavior in the presence of 
adjustment costs (Hamermesh 1993). The staggered native response can be justified a number of ways. The labor 
market is in continual flux, with persons entering and leaving the market. Because migration is costly, workers may 
find it optimal to time the lumpy migration decision concurrently with these transitions. Workers may also face 
constraints that prevent them from taking immediate advantage of regional wage differentials, including various 
forms of “job-lock” or short-term liquidity constraints. 
11 It may seem preferable to specify the supply function so that natives take into account the expected 
impact of continued future immigration. In a sense, however, the flow of immigrants (mij) is a “sufficient statistic” 
because I have assumed that the region receives the same number of immigrants in every period. 
12 This number equals the total number of natives in a skill group divided by the number of regions.   9
(6)   vij0 = σ (log wij,-1 – log w −




,1 log( / ). ij ij i NN − λ=  By definition, the variable λij is negative when the initial wage in 
region j is higher than the long-run equilibrium wage (in other words, there are fewer workers in 
region j than there will be after all internal migration takes place). Equation (6) then implies that 
the net migration rate in region j is positive (since η < 0). 
  Native net migration continues concurrently with the immigrant influx. The mathematical 
appendix shows that the native net-migration rate can be written as: 
 
(7)   vijt = ησ (1 + ησ)t λij + [1 – (1 + ησ)t] mi – [1 – (1 + ησ)t] mij , 
 
where  /, ii i mMN =  and Mi gives the per-period flow of immigrants in skill group i. I assume that 
the restriction 0 < (1 + ησ) < 1 holds throughout the analysis. 
The total number of native workers in cell (i, j, t) is then given by the sum of the initial 
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where ( 1) it i mtm =+   gives the stock of immigrants with skill i who have migrated as of time t 
relative to the number of natives with comparable skills; and  (1 ) ijt ij mtm = +   gives the relative 
stock of immigrants with skill i who have migrated to region j as of time t.13 The wage for 
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Equations (8) and (9) describe the evolution of Nijt and wijt for a particular skill group in a 
local labor market. The first two terms in each equation indicate that the (current) stock of native 
workers and the (current) wage level depend on pre-existing conditions. The equations also show 
how the size of the native workforce and wages adjust to the immigrant-induced shifts in supply. 
In particular, consider the behavior of the coefficients of the region-specific immigration stock 
variable () ijt m   in each of these equations. As t grows large, the coefficient in the native 
workforce regression (which should be negative) converges to –1, while the coefficient in the 
wage regression (which should also be negative) converges to zero. Put differently, the longer 
the time elapsed between the beginning of the immigrant influx and the measurement of the 
dependent variables, the more likely that native migration behavior has completely neutralized 
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in time (rather than the flow). The multiplicative factor used to define the stocks is (t + 1) rather than t because the 
immigrant influx began in period 0.   11
the immigrant-induced local supply shifts and the less likely that the spatial correlation approach 
will uncover any wage effect on local labor markets. 
Equally important, the two coefficients of the region-specific immigrant stock variable 
provide an intuitive interpretation of how the spatial correlation—that is, the impact of 
immigration on wages that can be estimated by comparing local labor markets—relates to the 
factor price elasticity η that gives the national wage impact of immigration. In particular, let γNt 
be the coefficient of the immigrant stock variable in the native workforce equation, and let γWt be 
the respective coefficient in the wage equation. Equations (8) and (9) then imply that: 
 
(10)   γWt = η (1 + γNt). 
  
The coefficient γNt approximately gives the number of natives who migrate out of a particular 
labor market for every immigrant who settles there ( / Nt t NM γ≈ ∂ ∂  ).14 The factor price elasticity 
η can be estimated by “blowing up” the spatial correlation, where the division factor is the 
number of natives who do not move per immigrant who enters the country. To illustrate, suppose 
that the coefficient γNt is –0.5, indicating that 5 fewer natives choose to reside in the local labor 
market for every 10 immigrants entering that market. Equation (10) then implies that the spatial 
correlation that can be estimated by comparing native wages across local labor markets is only 
half the size of the true factor price elasticity.15 
                                                 
14 In particular, note that  log / Nt ijt ijt N m γ= ∂ ∂  and that  /, ijt ijt mMN =    where N is a (fixed) native baseline. 
15 It is important to emphasize that the model presented here, although useful from an empirical 
perspective, is very restrictive. For instance, the model assumes that native workers anticipate the future impact of 
immigration, but ignores the fact that firms have similar expectations and that the capital stock will adjust in an 
optimal fashion to the immigrant-induced increase in labor supply, likely dampening the adverse wage effects of   12
 
Empirical Specification 
In the next section, I use data drawn from the 1960-2000 Censuses to estimate the key 
parameters of the model. These data provide five observations for Nijt, wijt, and  ijt M   (one for each 
Census cross-section) for labor markets defined by skill groups and geographic regions. The 
available data, therefore, are not sufficiently detailed to allow me to estimate the dynamic 
evolution of the native workforce and wage structure as summarized by equations (8) and (9). 
These equations, after all, have time-varying coefficients for the variable measuring the region-
specific immigrant influx, and these coefficients are highly nonlinear in time. I instead simplify 
the framework by applying the approximation (1 + x)t ≈ (1 + xt). Equations (8) and (9) can then 
be rewritten as:16 
 
(11)   log  Nijt = log Nij,-1 + ησ λij + ησ (t λij) – ησ it m   + ησ ijt m  , 
(12)   log  wijt = log wij,-1 + η2 σ λij + η2 σ (t λij) – η2 σ it m  + η(1 + ησ) ijt m  . 
 
  Equations (11) and (12) can be estimated by stacking the available data on the size of the 
native workforce, wages, and immigrant stock across skill groups, regions, and time. Many of 
the regressors in equations (11) and (12) are absorbed by including appropriately defined vectors 
                                                                                                                                                             
immigration and the need for native internal migration to equilibrate the labor market. Similarly, the asymptotic 
properties of the model result from restrictive assumptions about how the native workforce is distributed across skill 
groups, the nature of the immigrant inflows, the absence of capital flows, and the shape of the production function. It 
would be important to determine how these factors alter the interpretation of spatial correlations. Finally, a more 
complete analysis would explicitly incorporate the assumption that all agents—native workers, immigrants, and 
firms—have rational expectations about future immigration. 
16 I also use the approximation that t is relatively large so that the ratio t/(t +1) ≈ 1 and 1/t ≈ 0; in other 
words, the wage convergence process has been going on for some time before we observe the data points.   13
of fixed effects in the regressions. For example, the inclusion of fixed effects for the various 
skill-region cells absorbs the vector of variables (Nij,-1, λij) in equation (11) and the vector (wij,-1, 
λij) in equation (12). Similarly, interactions between skill and time fixed effects absorb the 
variable  it m   in both equations. 
In addition to these fixed effects, the regression models in (11) and (12) suggest the 
presence of two regressors that vary by skill, region, and time. The first, of course, is the region-
specific measure of the immigrant stock ( ) ijt m  , the main independent variable in any empirical 
study that attempts to estimate spatial correlations. The second is the variable (t λij), which is 
related to the (cumulative) net migration of natives that would have been observed as of time (t – 
1) had there been no immigration, and also introduces the initial conditions in the labor market 
into the regression analysis. This variable is not observable. In the empirical work reported 
below, I proxy for this variable by including regressors giving either a lagged measure of the 
number of natives in the workforce or the lagged growth rate of the native workforce in the 
particular labor market. 
The regression models in (11) and (12) provide some insight into why there is so much 
confusion in the empirical literature regarding the link between native internal migration and 
immigration or between wages and immigration. Even abstracting from the interpretation of the 
coefficient of the immigrant stock variable (which represent an amalgam of various structural 
parameters), this coefficient is estimated properly only if local labor market conditions are 
properly accounted for in the regression specification. 
Suppose, for instance, that immigrants enter those parts of the country that pay high 
wages. If the initial wage is left out of the wage regression, the observed impact of immigration 
on wages will be too positive, as the immigrant supply variable is capturing unobserved pre-  14
existing characteristics of high-wage areas. Similarly, suppose that immigrants tend to enter 
those parts of the country that also attract native migrants. If the regression equation does not 
control for the pre-existing migration flow, equation (11) indicates that the impact of 
immigration on the size of the native workforce will also be too positive. In fact, Borjas, 
Freeman, and Katz (1997, p. 30) provide a good example of how controlling for pre-existing 
conditions can actually change the sign of the correlation between net migration and 
immigration. In particular, they show that the rate of change in the number of natives living in a 
state is positively correlated with a measure of concurrent immigrant penetration in the cross-
section. But this positive correlation turns negative when they add a lagged measure of native 
population growth into the regression. 
The regression models also suggest that the geographic definition of a labor market is 
likely to influence the magnitude of the measured spatial correlations. In both regressions, the 
coefficient of the region-specific immigrant stock variable depends on the value of the parameter 
σ, the elasticity measuring the native migration response. The spatial correlation estimated in the 
native workforce regression depends negatively on σ, while the spatial correlation estimated in 
the wage regression depends positively on σ. The supply elasticity will probably be larger when 
migration is less costly, implying that σ will be greater when the labor market is geographically 
small.17 Equations (11) and (12) then imply that the spatial correlation between the size of the 
native workforce and the immigrant stock variable will be more negative when the model is 
estimated using geographically smaller labor markets, and that the spatial correlation between 
                                                 
17 Put differently, it is cheaper to migrate across metropolitan areas to escape the adverse affects of 
immigration than it is to migrate across states or Census divisions.   15
the wage and the immigrant stock variable will be more negative for larger labor markets. I will 
show below that the data indeed confirms this mirror-image implication of the theory.  
Finally, it is worth stressing that the coefficients of the immigrant stock variable in this 
linearized version of the two-equation model satisfy the multiplicative property given by 
equation (10). In sum, the theory provides a useful foundation for linking the results of very 
different conceptual and econometric frameworks in the study of the economic impact of 
immigration. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis uses data drawn from the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the U.S. Census. The 1960 and 1970 
samples represent a 1 percent sample of the population, while the 1980, 1990, and 2000 samples 
represent a 5 percent sample.18 The analysis is initially restricted to the subsample of men aged 
18-64, who do not reside in group quarters, are not enrolled in school, and worked in the civilian 
sector in the calendar year prior to the Census.19 A person is defined to be an immigrant if he was 
born abroad and is either a non-citizen or a naturalized citizen; all other persons are classified as 
natives. 
As in my earlier work (Borjas, 2003), I use both educational attainment and work 
experience to sort workers into particular skill groups. The key idea underlying this classification 
is that similarly educated workers with very different levels of work experience are unlikely to 
be perfect substitutes (Welch 1979; Card and Lemieux 2001). I classify the men into four distinct 
                                                 
18 The person weights provided in the public use files are used in the calculations.   16
education groups: workers who are high school dropouts (they have less than twelve years of 
completed schooling), high school graduates (they have exactly twelve years of schooling), 
persons who have some college (they have between thirteen and fifteen years of schooling), and 
college graduates (they have at least sixteen years of schooling). 
The classification of workers into experience groups is imprecise because the Census 
does not provide any measure of labor market experience or of the age at which a worker first 
enters the labor market. I assume that the age of entry (AT) into the labor market is 17 for the 
typical high school dropout, 19 for the typical high school graduate, 21 for the typical person 
with some college, and 23 for the typical college graduate. The measure of work experience is 
then given by (Age – AT).20 I restrict the analysis to persons who have between 1 and 40 years of 
experience. Welch (1979) suggests that workers in adjacent experience cells are more likely to 
influence each other’s labor market opportunities than workers in cells that are further apart. I 
capture the similarity among workers with roughly similar years of experience by aggregating 
the data into five-year experience intervals, indicating if the worker has 1 to 5 years of 
experience, 6 to 10 years, and so on. There are eight experience groups. 
A skill group i then contains workers who have a particular level of schooling and a 
particular level of experience. There are 32 such skill groups in the analysis (four education 
groups and eight experience groups). Consider a group of workers who have skills i, live in 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 The analysis uses the information provided by the variable giving the person’s labor force status in the 
survey week to exclude persons in the military. 
20 This definition of work experience is reasonably accurate for native men, but surely contains 
measurement errors when applied to working women, particularly in the earlier cross-sections when the female labor 
force participation rate was much lower. The definition also does not capture correctly the level of “effective” 
experience—the number of years of work experience that are valued by an American employer—in the sample of 
immigrants. Borjas (2003) finds that correcting for this problem does not greatly affect the measured wage impact of 
immigration.    17
region j, and are observed in calendar year t. The (i, j, t) cell defines a particular labor market at a 
point in time. The immigrant share in this labor market is defined by: 
 












where  ijt M   gives the stock of foreign-born workers in skill group i who have entered region j as 
of time t, and Nijt gives the number of native workers in that cell. The variable pijt thus measures 
the fraction of the workforce that is foreign-born in a particular labor market at a particular point 
in time. 
  I begin the empirical analysis by describing how immigration affected different labor 
markets in the past few decades. As indicated earlier, most of the immigrants who entered the 
United States in the past 40 years have clustered in a relatively small number of states. Figure 1 
shows the trends in the immigrant share, by educational attainment, for three groups of states: 
California, the other main immigrant-receiving states (Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, 
and Texas), and the rest of the country. Not surprisingly, the largest immigrant-induced supply 
increase occurred in California for the least-educated workers. By 2000, almost 80 percent of 
high-school dropouts in California were foreign-born, as compared to only 50 percent in the 
other immigrant-receiving states, and 20 percent in the rest of the country. Although the scale of 
the immigrant influx is smaller for high-skill groups, there is still a large disparity in the size of 
the supply increase across the three areas. In 2000, for example, over a quarter of college 
graduates in California were foreign-born, as compared to 18 percent in the other immigrant-
receiving states, and 8 percent in the rest of the country.   18
  Figures 2 and 3 continue the descriptive analysis by showing the trends in the immigrant 
share for some of the specific schooling-experience groups used in the analysis. To conserve 
space, I only illustrate these profiles for the two education groups most affected by immigration: 
high school dropouts (Figure 2) and college graduates (Figure 3). 
These figures show that there is significant dispersion in the relative size of the 
immigrant population over time and across experience groups, even when looking at a particular 
level of education and a particular part of the country. In 1980, for example, the immigration of 
high school dropouts in California was particularly likely to affect the labor market opportunities 
faced by workers with around 15 years of experience, where around half of the relevant 
population was foreign-born. In contrast, only 30 percent of the workers with more than 30 years 
of experience were foreign born. By 2000, however, over 80 percent of all high school dropouts 
with 10 to 35 years of experience were foreign-born. These patterns differed in other parts of the 
country. In the relatively non-immigrant rest of the country, immigration of high school dropouts 
was relatively rare prior to 1990, accounting for less than 10 percent of the workers in the 
relevant labor market. By 2000, however, immigrants made up more than 30 percent of the high 
school dropouts with 5 to 15 years of experience. 
  The data summarized in these figures, therefore, suggest that there has been a great deal 
of dispersion in how immigration affects the various skill groups in different regional labor 
markets. In some years, it affects workers in certain parts of the region-education-experience 
spectrum. In other years, it affects other workers. This paper exploits this variation to measure 
how wages and native worker migration decisions respond to immigration. 
Before proceeding to a formal analysis, it is instructive to document that the raw data 
reveals equally strong differences in the way that natives have chosen to sort themselves   19
geographically across the United States. More important, these location choices seem to be 
correlated with the immigrant-induced supply shifts. Figure 4 illustrates the aggregate trend. As 
first reported by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997), the share of the native-born population that 
chose to live in California stopped growing around 1970, at the same time that the immigrant 
influx began. This important trend is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 4. The data clearly 
show the relative numbers of native workers living in California first stalling, and eventually 
declining, as the scale of the immigrant influx increased rapidly.21 
The middle panel of Figure 4 illustrates a roughly similar trend in the other immigrant 
states. As immigration increased in these states (the immigrant share rose from about 8 percent in 
1970 to 22 percent in 2000), the fraction of natives who chose to live in those states declined 
slightly, from 26 to 24.5 percent. 
  Finally, the bottom panel of the figure illustrates the trend in the relatively non-immigrant 
areas that form the rest of the country. Although immigration also increased over time in this 
region, the increase has been relatively small (the immigrant share rose from 2.5 percent in 1970 
to 7.5 percent in 2000). At the same time, the share of natives living in this region experienced 
an upward drift, from 64.5 percent in 1970 to 66.5 percent in 2000. The evidence summarized in 
Figure 4, therefore, tends to suggest a link between native location decisions and immigration. 
This link is also evident at more disaggregated levels of geography and skills. I used all 
of the Census data available between 1960 and 2000 to calculate for each (i, j) cell the growth 
rate of the native workforce during each decade (defined as the log of the ratio of the native 
workforce at the decade’s two endpoints) and the corresponding decadal change in the immigrant 
share. The top panel of Figure 5 presents the scatter diagram relating these decadal changes at 
                                                 
21 Undoubtedly, other factors also account for California’s demographic trends in the past twenty years,   20
the state level after removing decade effects. The plot clearly suggests a negative relation 
between the growth rate of a particular class of native workers in a particular state and 
immigration. The bottom panel of the figure illustrates an even stronger pattern when the decadal 
changes are calculated at the metropolitan area level. In sum, the raw data clearly reveal that the 
native workforce grew fastest in those labor markets that were least affected by immigration. 
  Finally, Table 1 provides an alternative way of looking at the data that also links native 
migration decisions and immigration. Beginning in 1970, the Census contains information not 
only on the person’s state of residence as of the Census date, but also on the state of residence 
five years prior to the survey. These data can be used to construct net-migration rates for each of 
the skill groups in each geographic market, as well as in-migration and out-migration rates. (The 
construction of these rates will be described in detail later in the paper). To easily summarize the 
basic trends linking migration rates and immigration, I again break up the United States into 
three regions: California, the other immigrant-receiving states, and the rest of the country. A 
native worker is then defined to be an internal migrant if he moves across these three regions in 
the five-year period prior to the Census. 
  The differential trends in the net-migration rate across the three regions are revealing. 
Within each education group, there is usually a steep decline in the net migration rate into 
California, a slower decline in the net migration rate into the other immigrant states, and a slight 
increase in the net migration rate into the rest of the country. In other words, the net migration of 
natives fell most in those parts of the country most heavily hit by immigration. 
The other panels of Table 1 show that the relative decline in net migration rates in the 
immigrant-targeted states arises because of both a relative decline in the in-migration rate and a 
                                                                                                                                                             
including the impact of the defense cutbacks of the late 1980s and the high-tech boom of the late 1990s.   21
relative increase in the out-migration rate. For example, the in-migration rate of native high 
school dropouts into California fell from 7.6 to 4.0 percent between 1970 and 2000, as compared 
to a respective increase from 1.8 to 2.5 percent in the rest of the country. Similarly, the out-
migration rates of high school dropouts rose from 7.8 to 9.5 percent in California and from 3.6 to 
5.6 percent in the other immigrant states, but fell from 1.8 to 1.6 percent in those states least hit 
by immigration. 
 
IV. Immigration and Wages 
  In earlier work (Borjas, 2003), I showed that the labor market impact of immigration at 
the national level can be estimated by examining the wage evolution of skill groups defined in 
terms of educational attainment and experience. This section of the paper re-estimates some of 
the models presented in my earlier paper, and documents the sensitivity of the wage impact of 
immigration to the geographic definition of the labor market. 
I measure the wage impact of immigration using four alternative definitions for the 
geographic area covered by the labor market. In particular, I assume that the labor market facing 
a particular skill group is: (1) a closed national labor market, so that the wage impact of 
immigration estimated at this level of geography presumably measures the factor price elasticity 
η in the model; (2) a labor market defined by the geographic boundaries of the nine Census 
divisions; (3) a labor market that operates at the state level; or (4) a labor market bounded by the 
metropolitan area.22 
                                                 
22 The metropolitan area is defined in a roughly consistent manner across Censuses beginning in 1980. The 
analysis conducted at the metropolitan area level, therefore, uses only the 1980-2000 cross-sections and excludes all 
workers residing outside the identifiable metropolitan areas.   22
Let log wijt denote the mean log weekly wage of native men who have skills i, work in 
region j, and are observed at time t.23 I stack these data across skill groups, geographic areas, and 
Census cross-sections and estimate the model: 
 
(14)   log  wijt = θW pijt + si + rj + πt + (si × rj) + (si × πt) + (rj × πt) + ϕijt, 
 
where si is a vector of fixed effects indicating the group’s skill level; rj is a vector of fixed effects 
indicating the geographic area of residence; and πt is a vector of fixed effects indicating the time 
period of the observation. The linear fixed effects in equation (14) control for differences in labor 
market outcomes across skill groups, regions, and over time. The interactions (si × πt) and (sj × 
πt) control for secular changes in the returns to skills and in the regional wage structure during 
the 1960-2000 period. Finally, the inclusion of the interactions (si × rj) implies that the 
coefficient θW is being identified from changes in wages and immigration that occur within skill-
region cells. 
Note that the various vectors of fixed effects included in (14) correspond to the vectors of 
fixed effects implied by the estimating equation derived from the model [equation (12)]. The 
only exception is that (14) also includes interactions between region and Census year. These 
interactions would clearly enter the theory if demand shocks were allowed to differentially affect 
regions over time. 
The regression coefficients reported in this section come from weighted regressions, 
where the weight is the sample size used to calculate the mean log weekly wage in the (i, j, t) 
                                                 
23 The mean log weekly wage for each cell is calculated in the sample of salaried workers who do not 
reside in group quarters, are not enrolled in school, are in the civilian workforce, and report a positive value for 
annual earnings, weeks worked, and usual hours worked in the calendar year prior to the Census.   23
cell.24 The standard errors are clustered by skill-region cells to adjust for the possible serial 
correlation that may exist within cells. 
  Finally, the specification I use in the empirical analysis uses the immigrant share, p, 
rather than the relative number of immigrants as of time t, / , mMN =    as the measure of the 
immigrant-induced supply increase. It turns out that the relation between the various dependent 
variables and the relative number of immigrants is highly nonlinear, and is not captured correctly 
by a linear term in  . m   The immigrant share approximates log , m   so that using the immigrant 
share introduces some non-linearity into the regression model. In fact, the wage effects 
(appropriately calculated) are similar when including either logm   or a second-order polynomial 
in m   as the measure of the immigrant supply shift.25 
  Consider initially the first three columns of Table 2, which present the basic estimates of 
the adjustment coefficient θW obtained from the sample of working men. The first row 
summarizes the regression results when the geographic reach of the labor market is assumed to 
encompass the entire nation.26 The estimated coefficient is -0.533, with a standard error of 0.203. 
It is easier to interpret this coefficient by converting it to an elasticity that gives the percent 
                                                 
24 The coefficients of the immigrant share variable are quite similar when the regressions are not weighted.  
25 To illustrate, a regression of the log weekly wage on the relative number of immigrants variable m   (and 
all the fixed effects) has a coefficient of -0.160 (with a standard error of 0.082). The same regression on the log of 
the relative number variable has a coefficient of -0.071 (.027). Evaluated at the mean value of m   in 2000 (0.172), 
the implied wage elasticity is -0.41. A regression specification that includes a second-order polynomial in the 
relative number variable yields coefficients of -0.558 (0.214) and 0.298 (0.124), implying a wage elasticity of -0.45. 
The wage elasticity obtained from the immigrant share specification reported in Table 2 is -0.39. It is evident that 
the linear specification in m   greatly understates the wage impact of immigration. 
26 The specification of the national level regression differs slightly from the generic model presented in 
equation (14). In particular, the regression equation includes the immigrant share variable, fixed effects indicating 
the skill group, and fixed effects indicating the time period. Because it is impossible to introduce interactions 
between the skill group and the time period, I instead introduce all two-way interactions between the following three 
vectors: fixed effects indicating the group’s educational attainment, fixed effects indicating the group’s labor market 
experience, and fixed effects indicating the time period.    24
change in wages associated with a percent change in labor supply. In particular, define the wage 
elasticity as: 
 











By 2000, immigration had increased the size of the workforce by 17.2 percent. Equation (15) 
implies that the wage elasticity—evaluated at the mean value of the relative number of 
immigrants—can be obtained by multiplying θW by 0.73. The wage elasticity for weekly earnings 
is then −0.39 (or −0.532 × 0.73). Put differently, a 10 percent immigrant-induced supply 
increase—that is, an immigrant flow that increases the number of workers in a skill group by 10 
percent—reduces weekly earnings in that group by almost 4 percent. 
Suppose now that the worker’s state of residence defines the geographic area 
encompassed by the labor market. The data then consists of stacked observations on the 
immigrant share and the mean log weekly wage for cell (i, j, t). The first row of Panel III in 
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficient of the immigrant share variable when equation (14) is 
estimated at the state level. The adjustment coefficient is -0.217, with a standard error of .033. At 
the mean immigrant-induced supply shift, the state-level regression implies that a 10 percent 
increase in supply reduces the native wage by only 1.6 percent, roughly 40 percent of the 
estimated impact at the national level. Note that the derivative in equation (15) is precisely the 
wage impact of immigration captured by the region-specific immigrant stock variable in equation 
(12). In terms of the parameters of the theoretical model, this derivative estimates the product of 
elasticities η(1 + ση).   25
As discussed earlier, the model suggests that the log wage regression—when estimated at 
the local labor market level—should include a variable that approximately measures the lagged 
relative number of natives who would have migrated in the absence of immigration. The second 
row of the panel adds a variable giving the log of the size of the native workforce 10 years prior 
to the Census date.27 The inclusion of lagged employment does not alter the quantitative nature 
of the evidence. The adjustment coefficient is -0.220 (0.033). Finally, the third row of the panel 
introduces an alternative variable to control for the counterfactual native migration flow, namely 
the rate of growth in the size of the native workforce in the 10-year period prior to the census 
date. Again, the estimated wage effects are quite similar.  
The remaining panels in Table 2 document the behavior of the coefficient θW as the 
geographic boundary of the labor market is either expanded (to the Census division level) or 
narrowed (to the metropolitan area level). The key result implied by the comparison of the 
various panels is that the adjustment coefficient grows numerically larger as the geographic 
reach of the labor market expands. Using the simplest specification in row 1 in each of the 
panels, for example, the adjustment coefficient is -0.043 (0.025) at the metropolitan area level; 
increases to -0.217 (0.033) at the state level; increases further to -0.274 (0.053) at the division 
level; and jumps to -0.533 (0.203) at the national level. 
Up to this point, I have excluded working women from the analysis because of the 
inherent difficulty in measuring their labor market experience and classifying them correctly into 
the various skill groups. Nevertheless, the last three columns of Table 2 replicate the entire 
analysis using both working men and women in the regression models. The national-level 
coefficient is almost identical to that obtained when the regression analysis used only working 
                                                 
27 I used the 1950 Census to calculate the lagged workforce variable pertaining to the skill-region cells   26
men. Equally important, the regressions reveal the same clear pattern of a numerically smaller 
adjustment coefficient as the labor market becomes geographically smaller: from -0.352 (0.061) 
in the division-level regression, to -0.266 (0.037) in the state-level regression, to -0.057 (0.024) 
in the regressions estimates at the level of the metropolitan area. The results, therefore, are quite 
robust to the inclusion of working women. 
The theoretical model presented earlier suggests an interesting interpretation for this 
correlation between the geographic size of the labor market and the measured wage effect of 
immigration. As the geographic region becomes smaller, there is more spatial arbitrage—due to 
interregional flows of labor—that tends to equalize opportunities for workers of given skills 
across regions. 
An alternative explanation for the pattern is that the smaller wage effects measured in 
smaller geographic units may be due to attenuation bias. The variable measuring the immigrant 
stock will likely contain more measurement errors when it is calculated at more disaggregated 
levels of geography. As I show in the next section, it is unlikely that attenuation bias can explain 
the monotonic relation between the adjustment coefficient and the geographic reach of the labor 
market. 
Overall, the evidence seems to indicate that even though immigration has a sizable 
adverse effect on the wage of competing workers at the national level, the analysis of wage 
differentials across regional labor markets conceals much of that impact. The remainder of this 
paper examines if these disparate findings can be attributed to native internal migration 
decisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
drawn from the 1960 cross-section.   27
V. Immigration and Internal Migration 
  I now estimate a variety of models—closely linked to the theoretical discussion in 
Section II—to determine if the evolution of the native workforce or the internal migration 
behavior of natives is related to immigrant-induced supply increases in the respective labor 
markets. 
 
A. The Size of the Native Workforce 
Consider the following regression model: 
 
(16)   log  Nijt = Xijt β + θN pijt + si + rj + πt + (si × πt) + (rj × πt) +(si × rj) + εijt , 
 
where X is a vector of control variables discussed below. As with the wage regression specified 
earlier, the various vectors of fixed effects absorb any region-specific, skill-specific, and time-
specific factors that affect the evolution of the native workforce in a particular labor market. 
Similarly, the interactions allow for decade-specific changes in the number of workers in 
particular skill groups or in particular states caused by shifts in aggregate demand. Finally, the 
interaction between the skill and region fixed effects implies that the coefficient of the immigrant 
supply variable is being identified from changes that occur within a specific skill-region 
grouping. As before, all standard errors are adjusted for any clustering that may occur at the 
skill-region level.28 I again estimate the model using three alternative definitions for the 
                                                 
28 The regressions presented in this section are not weighted by the size of the sample used to calculate the 
dependent variable in a particular skill-region-time cell, as the weight is proportionately identical to the unlogged 
value of the dependent variable in some of the cross-sections, and differs only slightly in others (due to the presence 
of sampling weights in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses). A weighted regression is problematic because it introduces a 
strong positive correlation between the weight and the dependent variable (observations with large values of the 
dependent variable would mechanically count more in the regression analysis), and errors in the measurement of the   28
geographic area encompassed by the labor market: a Census division, a state, and a metropolitan 
area. Table 3 presents alternative sets of regression specifications that show how the immigrant-
induced supply shift affects the evolution of the size of the native workforce. 
  Consider initially the regressions estimated at the state level, reported in the middle panel 
of the table. The specification in row (1) uses the sample of working men and does not include 
any variables in the vector X. The estimated coefficient of the immigrant share variable is -0.381, 
with a standard error of 0.094. This regression model, therefore, confirms that there is a 
numerically important and statistically significant negative relation between immigration and the 
rate of growth of the native workforce at the state level. The coefficient is easier to interpret by 
calculating the derivative  /, NM ∂∂   which gives the change in the size of the native workforce 
when the stock of immigrant workers increases by one. It is easy to show that the derivative of 
interest is: 
 






+ ∂  
 
 
As before, the derivative in equation (17) can be evaluated at the mean value of the immigrant 
supply increase by multiplying the regression coefficient θN by 0.73. The simplest specification 
reported in Panel II of Table 3 implies that 2.8 fewer native workers chose to live in a particular 
state for every 10 additional immigrants entering that state. In terms of the theoretical model, 
equation (11) implies that the derivative reported in (17) estimates the product of elasticities ησ. 
                                                                                                                                                             
dependent variable would be amplified by the weighting scheme. This type of non-classical measurement error, 
which has not been appreciated sufficiently in previous studies, imparts a positive bias on the adjustment coefficient 
in equation (16). In fact, a weighted regression of the state-level specification reported in row 1 of Table 3 leads to 
an adjustment coefficient of -0.135 (0.094).    29
  The next two rows of the middle panel of Table 3 estimate more general specifications of 
the regression model. As noted earlier, I adjust for pre-existing migration flows by including 
either the lagged log of the number of native workers or the lagged rate of growth in the size of 
the native workforce. 29 I also include variables measuring the mean log weekly wage and the 
unemployment rate in the labor market (again measured at the state level).30 These additional 
variables control for factors that, in addition to immigration, motivate income-maximizing native 
workers to move from one market to another. 
Rows 2 and 3 yield very similar results, so the evidence is not sensitive to which variable 
is chosen to proxy for the lagged size of native net migration in the absence of immigration. Not 
surprisingly, lagged measures of the size of the native workforce or its growth rate have a 
positive impact on the current number of native workers. Similarly, the mean log wage has a 
positive (sometimes insignificant) coefficient, while the unemployment rate has a negative 
effect. The coefficient of the immigrant share variable falls to around −0.27 in the most general 
specification.31 This estimate implies that around 2 fewer native workers choose to reside in a 
particular state for every 10 additional immigrants who enter that state. 
The final two rows of the middle panel add the population of working women to the 
regression analysis. These regressions, in effect, examine the evolution of the entire workforce 
for a particular labor market defined by skills and region. The inclusion of women in this type of 
                                                 
29 To avoid re-introducing the dependent variable on the right-hand-side, the regressions presented in this 
section use the lagged growth rate of the native workforce 10 to 20 years prior to the Census date. For example, the 
lagged growth rate for the observation referring to high school graduates in Iowa in 1980 would be the growth rate 
in the number of high school graduates in Iowa between 1960 and 1970. This definition of the lagged growth rate 
implies that the regression models using this specification do not include any cells drawn from the 1960 Census. 
30 The mean log weekly wage and unemployment rate for each cell are calculated from the data available in 
each Census cross-section.   30
regression model could be problematic because of the possibility that many women may be tied 
movers or tied stayers, so that their location decisions may crucially depend on factors (such as 
family composition and the distribution of skills within the family) that are ignored in the study. 
Nevertheless, the state-level regressions suggest that, at least qualitatively, the inclusion of 
women barely alters the results. The coefficients of the immigrant share variable are not only 
negative and statistically significant, but are also roughly similar to the ones estimated in the 
sample of working men. 
  The other panels of Table 3 re-estimate the regression models at the census division and 
metropolitan area levels. The estimated impact of the immigrant supply variable typically has the 
wrong sign at the division level, but with large standard errors. In contrast, the adjustment 
coefficient is very negative (and statistically significant) at the metropolitan area level. The 
obvious conclusion to draw by comparing the three panels of the table is that the negative impact 
of the immigrant share variable gets numerically stronger the smaller the geographic boundaries 
of the labor market. In the general specification reported in row 2 for working men, for example, 
the estimated coefficient of the immigrant share variable is 0.055 (0.121) at the Census division 
level; -0.281 (0.081) at the state level; and -0.839 (0.091) at the metropolitan area level.32 The 
coefficient of the metropolitan area regression, in fact, implies that 6.1 fewer native workers 
choose to reside in a particular metropolitan area for every 10 additional immigrants who enter 
that locality. 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 The coefficient would be virtually identical if both the lagged level and growth rate of the native 
workforce were included in the regression. 
32 The metropolitan area regressions cannot be estimated with the lagged growth rate because that would 
then leave only one cross-section with sufficient data to estimate the model.   31
  It is worth noting that the geographic variation in the observed spatial correlation 
between the size of the native workforce and immigration is an exact mirror image of the 
geographic variation in the spatial correlation between wages and immigration reported in Table 
2. As implied by the model, the wage effects are larger when the impact of immigration on the 
size of the native workforce is weakest (at the Census division level); and the wage effects are 
weakest when the impact of immigration on the size of the native workforce is largest (at the 
metropolitan area level). 
It would seem as if this mirror-image pattern is not consistent with an attenuation 
hypothesis: more measurement error for data estimated at smaller geographic units would lead to 
smaller coefficient estimates at the metropolitan area level in both Tables 2 and 3. There is, 
however, one possible source of measurement error that could potentially explain the mirror-
image pattern. In particular, note that the adjustment coefficient θN estimated by equation (16) 
may suffer from division bias. The dependent variable appears (in transformed form) as part of 
the denominator in the immigrant share variable. If the size of the native workforce were 
measured with error, the division bias would lead to downward-biased estimates of the 
adjustment coefficient. One could argue that such measurement error would be more severe at 
the metropolitan area level than in larger geographic regions. 
I show below, however, that division bias does not play a central role in generating the 
mirror-image pattern of coefficients in Tables 2 and 3. Instead, the mirror-image pattern revealed 
by the two tables provides some support for the hypothesis that there is indeed a behavioral 
response by the native population that is contaminating the measured wage impact of 
immigration on local labor markets. 
   32
B. Migration Rates 
  Since 1970 the census contains detailed information on the person’s state of residence 
five years prior to the census, and since 1980 there is similar information for the metropolitan 
area of residence. These data, combined with the information on geographic location at the time 
of the census, can be used to compute in-, out-, and net-migration rates for native workers in the 
various skill-region groups. I now examine how these native migration rates respond to the 
immigrant influx. Therefore, the results presented in this section, which examine the flows of 
actual native movers, can be interpreted as providing independent confirmation of the findings 
presented above that link the evolution of the size of the native workforce to the immigrant 
influx. 
  To illustrate the calculation of the net migration rate, consider the data available at the 
state level in a particular census. The worker is an out-migrant from the “original” state of 
residence (that is, the state of residence five years prior to the survey) if he lives in a different 
state by the time of the census. The worker is an in-migrant into the current state of residence if 
he lived in a different state five years prior to the census. I define the in-migration and out-
migration rates by dividing the total number of in-migrants or out-migrants in a particular skill-
state-time cell by the relevant workforce in the baseline state.33 The net migration rate is then 
defined as the difference between the in-migration and the out-migration rate. To make the 
results in this section comparable to those reported in Table 3, I multiply all the migration rates 
by two—this adjustment converts the various rates into decadal changes (which was the unit of 
change implicitly used in the native workforce regressions). 
                                                 
33 The baseline state is the original state of residence when calculating out-migration rates and the current 
state of residence when calculating in-migration rates. Let Na be the number of native workers in the baseline state 
(in a particular skill group) five years prior to the Census, and let Nb be the number of workers in the same state at 
the time of the Census. The denominator of the in- and out-migration rates is then given by (Na + Nb)/2.   33
  I concluded the presentation of the theoretical model in Section II by deriving estimable 
equations that related the size of the native workforce and the native wage to the immigrant 
supply shift. This section uses a variation of the model with a different dependent variable. 
Equation (7) gives the expression for the net migration rate for cell (i, j, t). By using the 
approximation that (1 + x)t ≈ 1 + xt, the equation determining the net-migration rate, vijt, can be 
rewritten as: 
 
(18)   vijt = ησ λij + (ησ)2 (t λij) - ησ it m   + ησ ijt m   . 
 
  As before, the regression model that I actually use to analyze how migration rates 
respond to immigration is: 
  
(19)     yijt = Xijt β + θN pijt + si + rj + πt + (si × πt) + (rj × πt) +(si × rj) + εijt, 
 
where yijt represents the net-migration, in-migration, or out-migration rate for cell (i, j, t). Note 
that the coefficient of the region-specific immigrant share variable θN identifies the product of 
elasticities ησ. 
Table 4 summarizes the evidence. To conserve space, I only report the general 
specification that includes all of the variables in the vector X. Consider initially the regression 
results reported for the sample of working men in Panel II, where the dependent variable is the 
net migration rate estimated at the state level. Because the dependent variable in this regression 
model measures a change in the native population, I use the lagged native employment growth   34
rate as a preferred way of controlling for pre-existing conditions.34 The estimated coefficient of 
the immigrant share variable in the net migration regression is -0.284, with a standard error of 
0.064. As before, this coefficient is more easily interpretable by multiplying it by 0.73, indicating 
that 2.1 fewer native workers (on net) move to a particular state for every 10 immigrants who 
enter that state. It is worth noting that the estimated product of elasticities ησ is very similar to 
the corresponding estimate reported in Table 3, when the dependent variable was the log of the 
size of the native workforce. 
  Rows 2 and 3 of the middle panel show that the effect of immigration on net migration 
rates arises both because immigration induces fewer natives to move into the immigrant-
penetrated labor markets, and because immigration induces more natives to move out of those 
markets. The coefficient of the immigrant share variable in the in-migration regression is -0.151 
(0.042), while the respective coefficient in the out-migration regression is 0.133 (0.049). In 
rough terms, an influx of 10 immigrants into a state’s workforce induces 1 fewer native worker 
to migrate there and encourages 1 native worker already living there to move out. 
  Finally, the last row in the middle panel replicates the net migration rate regression in the 
sample of workers that includes both men and women. The adjustment coefficient is negative 
and significant (-0.232, with a standard error of 0.057). As before, the inclusion of women into 
the analysis does not fundamentally change the results. 
  The top and bottom panels of Table 4 reproduce the earlier finding that the negative 
impact of immigration on native migration rates is numerically larger as the geographic area that 
encompasses the labor market becomes smaller. In the sample of working men, the estimated 
                                                 
34 The use of the lagged native employment variable (instead of the lagged employment growth rate) would 
lead to very similar coefficients. In the state-level regressions, for example, the analogous specification to that 
reported in row 1 of the middle panel yields a coefficient of -0.291 (0.064).   35
coefficient of the immigrant share variable on the net migration rate is -0.076 (0.046) at the 
division level; -0.284 (0.064) at the state level; and -0.396 (0.086) at the metropolitan area 
level.35 The evidence, therefore, again suggests that natives find it much easier to respond to 
immigration by voting with their feet when the geographic area is relatively small, and that this 
response is attributable to both fewer in-migrants and more out-migrants. 
  More importantly, this mirror image pattern—relative to the respective pattern in the 
spatial correlations between wages and immigration—cannot be attributed to measurement error 
or division bias. After all, both the dependent variable (the net migration rate) and the 
independent variable (the immigrant share) have a measure of the year t native workforce in the 
denominator. If the size of the native workforce were measured with error, the division bias 
would now induce a positive bias in the adjustment coefficient θN. It seems plausible to argue 
that this bias would be most severe at the metropolitan area level—where the adjustment 
coefficient (although not as negative as the respective coefficient in Table 3) is still negative and 
numerically large. In short, the mirror-image pattern in the spatial correlations that is evident 
when comparing Tables 2 and 4, cannot be solely attributed to measurement error. It seems to be 
the result of a systematic behavioral response by native workers that helps to attenuate the wage 
impact of immigration on local labor markets.  
 
C. Sensitivity of the Evidence 
  As suggested by the descriptive evidence summarized earlier, the regression results 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 consistently reveal a numerically sizable and statistically significant 
                                                 
35 The inclusion of the lagged native workforce variable in the metropolitan area regressions implies that 
the regressions can only include the 1990 and 2000 cross-sections, as the 1970 Census does not contain the required 
information.   36
relation between native migration decisions and immigration. I have already shown that the 
results are unchanged when women are included in the analysis. I now examine whether the 
results are also robust to other major specification changes. 
Table 5 summarizes the sensitivity experiments that I conducted on the various regression 
models. To conserve space, the table reports the coefficients of the immigrant share variables 
estimated at the state level from the size-of-workforce and net migration regressions. For 
convenience, the top row of the table reproduces the “baseline” results obtained in the sample of 
working men that has been the focus of the discussion up to this point. 
I have used a 5-year experience aggregation to define the various skill groups. Although 
this classification attempts to capture the insight that workers with roughly the same level of 
experience are more likely to be perfect substitutes, the choice of the aggregation interval is 
arbitrary. The results, however, are robust to different classification schemes. Row 2 of Table 5 
reports the estimated coefficients when experience groups are defined in terms of 10-year 
groupings (1-10 years of experience, 11-20 years, and so on). The table clearly indicates that the 
coefficient of the immigrant share in all of the regressions is quite similar to that reported in the 
baseline specification. 
Similarly, the very different nature of the migration behavior of native workers who have 
just completed their schooling or who are about to retire might be confounding the underlying 
correlations. Row 3 of the table re-estimates the basic model (once again returning to the 5-year 
experience classification), but excludes workers who have fewer than 5 or more than 35 years of 
work experience. This specification of the model leads to regression coefficients that are quite 
similar to those reported in the baseline specification (though somewhat smaller in magnitude).   37
As I showed earlier, the state of California has played a central role in the resurgence of 
large-scale immigration in the past few decades. California has atypical labor market 
characteristics; it is a very large state with historically high native net-migration rates, a 
relatively high-skill workforce, and a huge immigrant influx. These characteristics could 
contaminate many of the results presented above. It is important, therefore, to determine if the 
sign or magnitude of the estimated coefficients are driven by the outlying observations that 
describe the outcomes for specific skill groups in California. Row 4 of Table 5 re-estimates the 
baseline regression models in the subsample of skill-state-year cells that excludes all the 
California observations. Remarkably, despite the demographic importance of California, there is 
very little change in the regression coefficients: the adjustment coefficient in either the size-of-
workforce or the net migration rate regressions still hovers around -0.3. 
  As I showed earlier, many of the outlying skill-region (in terms of the size of the 
immigrant influx) likely contain workers who are high school dropouts, and the determinants of 
the migration behavior of native high school dropouts may differ substantially from that of native 
workers with higher levels of educational attainment.36 It is important, therefore, to assess the 
sensitivity of the results to the presence of these outlying observations. Row 5 re-estimates the 
model using the subsample of workers who have at least 12 years of schooling (so there are now 
only 3 education groups in the analysis). The coefficient of the immigrant share variable in the 
native workforce regression becomes even more negative (-0.97, with a standard error of 0.18) 
                                                 
36 Many studies, including some of the classic articles in the economics of internal migration, analyze the 
strong positive correlation between migration propensities and education (Sjaastad 1962; Ladinksy 1967; and the 
survey by Greenwood 1997). The analysis in this paper assumes that the elasticity measuring the marginal response 
of immigrant-induced supply increases to native migration propensities is the same for all skill groups. The inclusion 
of skill-specific fixed effects throughout the regression analysis, however, allows the various groups to differ in their 
migration propensities.   38
when the high school dropouts are excluded from the sample, but the coefficient in the net 
migration regression is stable at around -0.28. 
Finally, row 6 reports an equally interesting exercise when we redefine the high school 
dropout category to include only those workers who have between 9 and 11 years of schooling. 
In 2000, 22.1 percent of immigrants had 8 or fewer years of schooling. It is doubtful that these 
very low-skill immigrants are competing in the same labor market as the native high school 
dropouts, 80 percent of whom have between 9 and 11 years of schooling. To analyze the 
sensitivity of the results to this potential mismatch within the high school dropout category, I 
simply omitted from the study any workers who have 8 or fewer years of schooling. The high 
school dropout category, therefore, now is composed entirely of workers who have 9 to 11 years 
of schooling. The last row of Table 5 shows that the coefficient of the immigrant share variable 
in the size-of-workforce regression is large and negative, while the coefficient in the net-
migration rate regression still hovers at -0.3. 
In sum, the sensitivity experiments summarized in this section show that major changes 
in the specification of the regression models do not alter the qualitative (and often quantitative) 
nature of the evidence. Immigrant-induced increases in labor supply are associated with lower 
native net migration rates, lower in-migration rates, higher out-migration rates, and a smaller 
growth rate in the size of the native workforce in the affected labor markets. 
It is important to emphasize that there is a striking contrast between the robustness of the 
evidence summarized here and the evidence reported in prior studies. The nature of the link 
between native internal migration and immigration has attracted a great deal of attention in both 
the economics and geography literatures. A number of studies, led by Filer (1992), Frey (1995, 
1996), Frey et al. (1996), and White and Hunter (1993), reported evidence consistent with a   39
“demographic balkanization” of natives and immigrants: natives respond to immigration by 
moving to areas that had not been affected by immigration. Subsequent studies, including those 
of Wright, Ellis, and Reibel (1997), White and Imai (1994), Card and DiNardo (2000), Card 
(2001), and Kritz and Gurak (2001), presented opposing evidence that questioned the 
demographic importance of this presumed relation. It should be noted, however, that the studies 
differ greatly in the time periods analyzed, in sample design, in definitions of the geographic 
region, and in the methodological framework (see the survey-like discussion in Kritz and Gurak, 
2001, pp. 133-135). As a result, it is difficult to determine exactly why there is so much 
dispersion in the evidence across studies. 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper differs from the existing literature in three 
distinct ways. First, the study is strongly embedded in a theoretical framework that emphasizes 
the importance of netting out pre-existing conditions when attempting to measure the nature of 
the link between native migration and immigration. As I noted earlier, there is evidence that the 
sign of the correlation between native migration and immigration can easily switch depending on 
how a particular study controls for pre-existing conditions (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997). To 
illustrate, some states have been long-time recipients of native internal migrants. These states 
may also have become important gateways for new immigrants, thus introducing a spurious 
positive correlation between native net migration and immigration. The correct measure of the 
impact of immigration on native migration would then depend on how the net migration rate of 
natives into these states changed relative to what it was in the pre-immigration regime. 
The current study uses a far longer panel of data than other studies in the literature, many 
of which have used a single census cross-section to uncover what is undoubtedly a relation that 
has a crucial time dimension. Card (2001) and Kritz and Gurak (2001), for example, estimate   40
correlations using data exclusively from the 1990 census. Although it is unclear what such cross-
section correlations actually measure, it is evident that they do not measure the parameters of 
interest in the context of a dynamic model of native location decisions. The use of a forty-year 
panel that includes repeated observations on the location decision of native workers and 
immigrant-induced supply increases experienced by specific groups allows the empirical analysis 
to net out the long-run trends that undoubtedly characterize internal migration flows for 
particular groups or particular regions, and thus helps to isolate the impact of immigration. 
Second, I emphasize the common-sense (though obviously restrictive) notion that 
income-maximizing natives will respond to immigration only if their economic opportunities are 
affected. The immigration of one particular skill group will likely affect the earnings of that skill 
group more than the earnings of other groups, and one would expect a corresponding differential 
effect on native migration rates. The empirical study presented here defined skill groups in terms 
of years of education and work experience—and it is partly this narrower focus on the 
composition of the skill groups affected by large-scale immigration that allows me to measure a 
consistent correlation that seems to have been missed by some of the earlier studies. 
Finally, my analysis builds on the strong theoretical implication that there exists a 
systematic relation between the wage structure, native migration decisions, and immigration—
and that the nature of this relation is closely linked to the geographic reach of the labor market. 
The empirical confusion on the nature of the correlation between native migration decisions and 
immigration is not unique in the immigration literature. As noted earlier, there is an equally 
confusing set of results contained in the studies that attempt to estimate the labor market impact 
of immigration by correlating wages in the local labor market and measures of immigrant 
penetration (see Borjas, 2003, for a discussion). The analysis presented here argues that the   41
empirical confusion in these two seemingly unrelated literatures is, in fact, intimately linked. In 
an important sense, this paper attempts to reconcile the diverse set of findings in two literatures 
that have not been closely linked before: the impact of immigration on wages and the impact of 
immigration on native location decisions. 
 
D. Synthesis 
  The theoretical model presented in Section II suggests that the national wage effect of 
migration and the spatial correlations estimated between wages and immigration across local 
labor markets are linked through a parameter that measures the native migration response. I now 
examine whether the large difference actually estimated in Section III in the wage impacts for 
different geographic definitions of the labor market can be “explained” by the impact of 
immigration on native location decisions. 
  Table 6 summarizes the key results of the study. The first row of the table reports that the 
wage effect at the national level was estimated to be -0.389 (or the coefficient of −0.533 in Table 
2 times 0.73). I assume that the national labor market approximates the concept of a closed 
economy, so that this coefficient estimates the factor price elasticity η.37 The theoretical model 
presented in this paper implies that the estimated wage effect of immigration will not equal this 
factor price elasticity whenever the corresponding wage regression is estimated using 
observations on local labor markets where natives can respond to immigration by moving across 
markets. The spatial correlation will be numerically smaller, and the gap between the spatial 
correlation and the true factor price elasticity should reflect the native migration effect. 
                                                 
37 Put differently, I assume that the supply elasticity σ = 0 at the national level.   42
Row 2 of Table 6 summarizes the estimated migration effects reported earlier (again 
multiplied by 0.73).38 This row, therefore, reports the value of the derivative  / . N NM γ= ∂ ∂   
These migration responses allow me to predict what the spatial correlations should be by using 
the multiplicative property of the model summarized in equation (10). In particular, let 
log / , W wm γ= ∂ ∂   the wage effect of immigration at a particular geographic level. The theory 
then predicts that the spatial correlation between wages and immigration, ˆ , W γ  is given by: 
 
(20)   ˆ (1 ). WN γ= η+ γ  
 
Row 3 of Table 6 uses this equation to mechanically predict the spatial correlations that 
should be observed if the only adjustment mechanism contaminating the estimation procedure 
was the internal migration of native workers. To illustrate, consider the migration response 
revealed by the simplest specification of the size-of-workforce regression at the state level. This 
regression implies that γN = −0.278. The theory then implies that the wage elasticity estimated by 
relating native wages across states and immigration should be −0.28 (or −0.389 × (1 − 0.278)), 
roughly a cut of one-quarter in the estimated national wage effect. At the metropolitan area level, 
the migration response is quite large, implying that the spatial correlation between wages and 
immigration measurable at the metropolitan area level should be −0.17. If I instead use the 
migration responses estimated in the net migration regressions, the predicted spatial correlations 
are −0.31 and −0.28 at the state and metropolitan area levels, respectively. 
                                                 
38 The estimated effects for the size of the native workforce are drawn from rows 1 and 2 of Table 3, and 
row 1 of Table 4.   43
Finally, row 4 of Table 6 reports the actual spatial correlations estimated in the data (and 
first reported in Table 2). At the state level, the wage impact of immigration is around −0.16. The 
evidence summarized in Table 6, therefore, indicates that the internal migration response of 
native workers accounts for about 40 percent of the gap between the wage effects estimated at 
the state level and at the national level. At the metropolitan area level, the data indicate that the 
native internal migration response may account for as much as 60 percent of the difference. 
This synthesis fails to explain the difference between the national wage effect and the 
spatial correlation between wages and immigration estimated at the Census division level. It may 
well be that Census divisions are not an economically meaningful analogue to a labor market. It 
is also the case that much of the migration that takes place in the United States is within 
divisions. Between 1995 and 2000, for example, 11.6 percent of the working-age population 
migrated across metropolitan areas; 9.4 percent migrated across states; and only 6.8 percent 
migrated across divisions. The use of division-level data, therefore, is probably masking a great 
deal of the native migration response to immigrant-induced supply shifts. 
 
VI. Summary 
  The empirical literature that attempts to estimate the labor market impact of immigration 
faces an important puzzle. Studies that examine how immigration alters economic opportunities 
across local labor markets tend to find that immigration has a negligible impact on the wage of 
competing native workers, while studies that examine how immigration alters economic 
opportunities at the national level tend to find substantial wage effects. This paper presented a 
theoretical and empirical analysis of one possible adjustment mechanism that can explain the 
disparate findings: the internal migration decisions made by native workers.   44
The theoretical model presented in this paper illustrates how native migration flows 
diffuse the impact of immigration across the entire economy, making it difficult to measure the 
“true” wage impact of immigration by comparing conditions across local labor markets. More 
importantly, the theory provides a framework that explicitly links the parameters measuring the 
national wage effect of immigration, the spatial correlation estimated across local labor markets, 
and the impact of immigration on native migration decisions.  
The empirical analysis used data drawn from the 1960-2000 decennial Censuses. The 
evidence indicates that native internal migration decisions are sensitive to immigrant-induced 
increases in labor supply. The native population in a particular skill group grew slowest in those 
parts of the country that experienced the largest immigrant influx. This native supply response is 
evident both in terms of a decline in native in-migration and an increase in native out-migration. 
The net native migration response is sizable: for every 10 immigrants who enter a particular state 
two fewer natives choose to live in that state. The response is even larger at the metropolitan area 
level: for every 10 immigrants who choose to enter a particular metropolitan area between 3 and 
6 natives will choose not to live in that locality. 
These migration responses are sufficiently large to explain an important part of the 
disparate findings obtained in studies that estimate the wage effects of immigration at the 
national and local labor market levels. At the state level, the native migration response explains 
about 40 percent of the gap in wage effects. At the metropolitan area level, the migration 
response may explain as much as 60 percent of the gap. 
Naturally, labor markets adjust to immigration in many other ways. Although native 
migration can explain a good part of the adjustment mechanism, it is likely that flows of goods or   45
capital are also important ingredients in the story. The magnitude, economic significance, and 
labor market consequences of those flows are yet to be determined. 
   46
Mathematical Appendix 
 
To simplify the mathematical derivations, it is useful to start with a simpler version of the 
immigrant influx, a one time supply increase. In particular, Mij0 immigrants enter region j at time 
0. Native migration will then occur for two reasons: a response to the initial disequilibrium, and a 
response to the impact of immigrants on the wage structure. It is useful to consider these two 
responses separately. As a result of the initial disequilibrium, equation (6) in the text shows that 
vijo = ησ λij. By solving the model recursively, it follows that vijt = ησ (1 + ησ)t λij. 
The native response to the one-time immigrant supply increase will depend on the 
geographic sorting of immigrants relative to the geographic sorting of the native population. 
Suppose region j has (in the pre-immigration regime) a fraction qij of the native population in 
skill group i and receives a fraction ρij of the immigrants in that skill group. The region-specific 
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where kij = ρij / qij, a measure of the penetration of immigrants into region j relative to the 
region’s pre-immigration size (for a particular skill group). Immigration is distributed neutrally if 
kij = 1. 
  The impact of the one-time immigrant supply on native migration can be solved 
recursively. In particular, the supply increase induces ησ(kij – 1)mi natives to move in period 1,   47
ησ(1 + ησ)(kij – 1)mi in period 2, and ησ(1 + ησ)t(kij – 1)mi in period t. Combining both sources 
of native migration flows, the native net migration rate in year t is then given by: 
 
(A-2)  
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I assume that 0 < (1 + ησ) < 1. 
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The model can now be more easily extended to the case where the immigrant influx 
continues indefinitely. The last term of equation (A-3), call if Yijt, gives the (cumulative) net 
migration rate of natives as of time t induced by a period-0 immigrant supply increase. Consider 
now what the native response would be to a similarly-sized supply increase occurring at t = 1. 
The net migration rate of natives induced by the period-1 migration flow would be Yij,t-1. The 
total net migration of natives in period t attributable to a supply increase of kjjmi in region j 
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Equation (7) follows directly by noting that kijmi= mij. Equations (8) and (9) can be derived by 
substituting (A-4) in both the equation that determines the current size of the workforce in a 
particular labor market and in the labor demand function.    49
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Figure 1. The immigrant share of the male workforce,  




































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Geographic sorting of native workforce and immigration 
 
A. California 
B. Other immigrant states 
C. Rest of the country 




























































































































































































Figure 5. Scatter diagram relating the growth rate 
 of the native workforce and immigration 
 
A. State level data 
 
B. Metropolitan area level data 
Notes: Each data point represents the decadal change (for the 1960-2000 period in the top panel and the 1980-2000 
period in the bottom panel) in the log size of the native workforce and in the immigrant share for a particular skill 
group in a particular geographic area. Both plots remove decade effects from the data.   57
Table 1. Trends in inter-area migration rates of native workers 
 
  Year 
 Area 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Net  migration  rates        
High  school  dropouts  California  -0.2% -2.2% -2.3% -5.4% 
  Other immigrant states  0.3  -0.2  -1.6  -1.4 
  Rest of country  -0.1  0.3  0.8  1.0 
High  school  graduates  California  0.3 -1.4 -0.8 -4.5 
  Other immigrant states  0.0  -0.1  -0.8  -0.9 
  Rest of country  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.7 
Some  college  California  1.3 -1.0  0.3 -3.4 
  Other immigrant states  -0.4  -0.3  -0.9  -0.8 
  Rest of country  -0.2  0.4  0.3  0.9 
College  graduates  California  4.4 3.3 4.5 1.9 
  Other immigrant states  0.3  -0.3  -0.8  -0.4 
  Rest of country  -1.0  -0.4  -0.5  -0.1 
        
In-migration  rates        
High  school  dropouts  California  7.6 6.9 6.2 4.0 
  Other immigrant states  3.8  4.7  4.5  4.2 
  Rest of country  1.8  2.3  2.6  2.5 
High  school  graduates  California  8.7 8.3 7.7 4.9 
  Other immigrant states  5.4  6.0  5.2  4.6 
  Rest of country  2.7  2.8  2.6  2.5 
Some  college  California  8.6 8.8 7.8 5.3 
  Other immigrant states  7.0  8.1  6.7  6.2 
  Rest of country  4.4  4.8  4.0  3.6 
College  graduates  California  14.3 14.1 13.0 11.1 
  Other immigrant states  11.9  11.9  10.0  9.4 
  Rest of country  6.2  6.3  5.4  4.8 
        
Out-migration  rates        
High  school  dropouts  California  7.8 9.1 8.5 9.5 
  Other immigrant states  3.6  4.9  6.1  5.6 
  Rest of country  1.8  2.0  1.9  1.6 
High  school  graduates  California  8.3 9.7 8.5 9.5 
  Other immigrant states  5.4  6.1  6.0  5.5 
  Rest of country  2.7  2.6  2.3  1.7 
Some  college  California  7.3 9.8 7.5 8.7 
  Other immigrant states  7.4  8.4  7.6  7.0 
  Rest of country  4.6  4.4  3.7  2.8 
College graduates  California  9.9  10.8  8.4  9.2 
  Other immigrant states  11.7  12.1  10.8  9.8 
  Rest of country  7.2  6.7  5.9  4.9 
 
Notes: This table breaks up the country into three distinct areas: California, the other immigrant states, and the rest 
of the country. The “other immigrant states” include Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. 
A native worker is defined to migrate if he moves from one of these areas to another in the five-year period prior to 
the Census.    58
Table 2. Impact of immigration on log weekly earnings,  
by geographic definition of the labor market 
 





























I.  National            
(1) -0.533  ---  ---  -0.532  ---  --- 
 (0.203)      (0.189)     
           
II. Census division             
(1) -0.274  ---  ---  -0.352  ---  --- 
 (0.053)      (0.061)     
(2) -0.273  -0.043  ---  -0.350  -0.040 --- 
 (0.053)  (0.019)    (0.061)  (0.017)   
(3) -0.274  ---  0.048  -0.351  ---  0.048 
 (0.052)    (0.014)  (0.062)    (0.015) 
           
III. State             
(1) -0.217  ---  ---  -0.266  ---  --- 
 (0.033)      (0.037)     
(2) -0.220  -0.027  ---  -0.271  -0.033   
 (0.033)  (0.007)    (0.037)  (0.007)   
(3) -0.215  ---  0.033  -0.265  ---  0.035 
 (0.033)    (0.005)  (0.037)    (0.006) 
            
IV. Metropolitan area           
(1) -0.043  ---  ---  -0.057  ---  --- 
 (0.025)      (0.024)     
(2) 0.021  -0.016  ---  -0.001  -0.010  --- 
 (0.048)  (0.012)    (0.051)  (0.012)   
(3) 0.048  ---  0.030  0.024  ---  0.030 
 (0.047)    (0.008)  (0.050)    (0.008) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the region-skill group level. All regressions 
are weighted by the size of the sample used to calculate the mean of weekly earnings in the specific region-skill-year 
cell. The regressions estimated at the national level have 160 observations; the regressions estimated at the region 
level have 1,440 observations; the regressions estimated at the state level have 8,160 observations (8,083 
observations when lagged native employment is included); and the regressions estimated at the metropolitan area 
level have 25,184 (14,848) observations. The regressors in the national-level regression include a vector of skill 
fixed effects, a vector of time fixed effects, and all possible two-way interactions between a vector of education 
fixed effects, a vector of experience fixed effects, and a vector of time fixed effects. The regressions presented in the 
bottom three panels include a vector of skill fixed effects, a vector of (appropriately defined) region fixed effects, a 
vector of time fixed effects, and all possible two-way interactions among these vectors.    59
Table 3. Impact of immigration on the size of the native workforce 
(Dependent variable = log of number of natives in workforce) 
 
  Independent variables 















I. Census divisions           
1. Men  -0.023  ---  ---  ---  --- 
 (0.158)         
2. Men  0.055  0.243  ---  0.172  -1.327 
 (0.121)  (0.042)    (0.116)  (0.437) 
3. Men  0.139  ---  0.094  0.264  -1.485 
 (0.147)    (0.031)  (0.158)  (0.529) 
4. Men and women  0.106  0.306  ---  0.072  -1.282 
 (0.107)  (0.048)    (0.124)  (0.402) 
5. Men and women  0.243  ---  0.085  0.071  -1.816 
 (0.133)    (0.034)  (0.167)  (0.483) 
        
II.  State        
1. Men  -0.381  ---  ---  ---  --- 
 (0.094)         
2. Men  -0.281  0.056  ---  0.020  -0.376 
 (0.081)  (0.015)    (0.048)  (0.194) 
3. Men  -0.273  ---  0.037  0.117  -0.635 
 (0.085)    (0.011)  (0.056)  (0.208) 
4. Men and women  -0.300  0.106  ---  -0.002  -0.597 
 (0.082)  (0.015)    (0.047)  (0.176) 
5. Men and women  -0.218  ---  0.043  0.075  -0.611 
 (0.083)    (0.011)  (0.054)  (0.184) 
        
III. Metropolitan area           
1. Men  -0.785  ---  ---  ---  --- 
 (0.060)         
2. Men  -0.839  -0.402  ---  0.072  -0.307 
 (0.091)  (0.022)    (0.044)  (0.151) 
3. Men and women  -0.712  -0.365  ---  0.057  -0.237 
 (0.087)  (0.021)    (0.044)  (0.125) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the region-skill group level. The regressions 
estimated at the region level have 1,440 observations (1,152 observations when the lagged native employment 
growth is included); the regressions estimated at the state level have 8,160 (6,451) observations; and the regressions 
estimated at the metropolitan area level have 25,183 (14,848) observations. All regressions include a vector of skill 
fixed effects, a vector of (appropriately defined) region fixed effects, a vector of time fixed effects, and all possible 
two-way interactions among these vectors.   60
 Table 4. Impact of immigration on migration rates of native workers 
 
  Independent variable 










I. Census division         
1. Net migration rate, men  -0.076  0.060  0.147  -0.048 
 (0.046)  (0.023)  (0.056)  (0.206) 
2. In-migration rate, men  -0.103  -0.016  0.110  0.151 
 (0.034)  (0.010)  (0.040)  (0.143) 
3. Out-migration rate, men  -0.027  -0.076  -0.037  0.200 
 (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.040)  (0.165) 
4. Net migration rate, men and women  -0.082  0.066  0.071  0.059 
 (0.042)  (0.019)  (0.051)  (0.189) 
        
II. State         
1. Net migration rate, men  -0.284  -0.019  0.012  0.242 
 (0.064)  (0.014)  (0.070)  (0.216) 
2. In-migration rate, men  -0.151  -0.055  0.018  0.026 
 (0.042)  (0.009)  (0.035)  (0.127) 
3. Out-migration rate, men  0.133  -0.036  0.007  -0.216 
 (0.049)  (0.012)  (0.052)  (0.171) 
4. Net migration rate, men and women  -0.232  -0.005  0.051  -0.125 
 (0.057)  (0.015)  (0.058)  (0.187) 
        
III. Metropolitan area         
1. Net migration rate, men  -0.396  -0.084  -0.046  0.094 
 (0.086)  (0.015)  (0.042)  (0.137) 
2. In-migration rate, men  -0.114  -0.077  -0.018  0.054 
 (0.057)  (0.009)  (0.027)  (0.092) 
3. Out-migration rate, men  0.282  0.007  0.028  -0.041 
 (0.062)  (0.010)  (0.028)  (0.095) 
4. Net migration rate, men and women  -0.336  -0.093  -0.057  0.029 
 (0.073)  (0.015)  (0.037)  (0.104) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the region-skill group level. The regressions 
estimated at the region level have 1,152 observations; the regressions estimated at the state level have 6,528 
observations; and the regressions estimated at the metropolitan area level have 14,848 observations. All regressions 
include a vector of skill fixed effects, a vector of (appropriately defined) region fixed effects, a vector of time fixed 
effects, and all possible two-way interactions among these vectors.   61
Table 5. Sensitivity of migration results at state level 
(Coefficient of immigrant share variable) 
 
  Dependent variable 








1. Baseline (men)  -0.281  -0.284  -0.151  0.133 
 (0.081)  (0.064)  (0.042)  (0.049) 
        
2. Uses 10-year experience groups  -0.331  -0.244  -0.105  0.139 
 (0.194)  (0.076)  (0.045)  (0.058) 
        
3. Excludes workers with less than 5   -0.224  -0.227  -0.116  0.112 
or more than 35 years of experience  (0.085)  (0.065)  (0.044)  (0.050) 
        
4. Excludes California  -0.293  -0.262  -0.140  0.122 
 (0.087)  (0.071)  (0.047)  (0.049) 
        
5. Excludes high school dropouts  -0.966  -0.283  -0.251  0.032 
 (0.164)  (0.218)  (0.123)  (0.158) 
        
6. Excludes workers with 8 or fewer   -0.896  -0.303  -0.175  0.129 
years of schooling  (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.085)  (0.082) 
 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses; all standard errors are clustered by skill and region. The baseline 
male regressions on the log of the native workforce have 8,160 observations (6,528 observations in the migration 
rate regressions); the regressions using the 10-year experience groupings have 4,045 (3,264) observations; the 
regressions excluding workers with fewer than 5 or more than 35 years of experience have 6,058 (4,896) 
observations; the non-California regressions have 7,906 (6,398) observations; the regressions for workers with at 
least a high school education have 6,039 (4,892) observations; and the regressions estimated in the sample of 
workers with at least 9 years of education has 8,043 (6,522) observations. All regressions include a vector of skill 
fixed effects, a vector of (appropriately defined) region fixed effects, a vector of time fixed effects, all possible two-
way interactions among these vectors, and the mean log weekly wage and unemployment rate in the labor market. In 
addition, the regressions on the log size of the native workforce include the lagged value of the log of the native 
workforce, while the migration rate regressions include the lagged value of the growth rate of the native workforce. 
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Table 6. Synthesis of wage and migration effects 
 
 Census 
division  State  Metropolitan 
area 
1. Estimate of factor price elasticity (in national  -0.389  -0.389  -0.389 
labor market)       
      
2. Estimate of migration effect:       
Simple specification: native workforce  -0.017  -0.278  -0.573 
Complete specification: native workforce  0.040  -0.205  -0.612 
Complete specification: net migration -0.055  -0.207  -0.289 
      
3. Predicted estimate of wage elasticity at local level:        
Simple specification: native workforce  -0.382  -0.281  -0.166 
Complete specification: native workforce  ---  -0.309  -0.151 
Complete specification: net migration -0.368  -0.308  -0.277 
      
4. Wage elasticity actually estimated at local level:       
Simple specification  -0.200  -0.158  -0.031 
Complete specification  -0.199  -0.161  0.015 
 
Notes: The synthesis is based on the theory-based interpretation of the coefficients reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4. 
See the text for details. 